At Any Cost:
How Ukrainians Think about Self-Defense Against Russia

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Abstract
How do Ukrainians view the costs and benefits of armed self-defense? The moral principle of proportionality demands that the expected costs of self-defense do not exceed its projected benefits. A different way of thinking about self-defense is in categorical terms: we should effectively resist aggression regardless of the costs. We examine support for different strategies Ukraine could pursue against Russia, using a conjoint survey experiment with 1,160 Ukrainian respondents, fielded in July 2022. The strategies have projected outcomes with varying degrees of political autonomy and territorial integrity and three expected costs: civilian fatalities, deaths among Ukrainian fighters, and risk of nuclear escalation. We find that Ukrainians do not trade off territorial or political concessions against reducing the costs of fighting Russia. Introducing a new methodology to rank the importance of conjoint-attributes, we show that 79% of respondents categorically reject strategies leading to a Russian-controlled government, regardless of the costs.

Keywords: Attitudes toward war, self-defense, proportionality, conjoint design, Ukraine
Introduction

Two months into Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called on Ukraine to cede territory to Russia to end the war.\(^1\) He was not alone. Statesmen, scholars, and pundits routinely urge Ukrainians to give up self-defense,\(^2\) citing the likelihood that Ukraine will be defeated by its much bigger neighbour,\(^3\) the toll of resistance on civilians,\(^4\) and the risk of nuclear escalation.\(^5\) Ukraine has a just cause for war against Russia: self-defense. This is widely agreed in public discourse. Yet, a war with a just cause can still be an unjust war. It can be morally wrong to pursue armed self-defense if there is little chance of victory or the expected costs of fighting exceed the projected benefits (Fabre 2015; Haque 2012; McMahan 2009). Such a defensive war would be disproportionate. Public calls on Ukraine to negotiate or surrender often imply that Ukraine’s armed self-defense is disproportionate and hence morally wrong.

How do ordinary Ukrainians view the costs and benefits of armed self-defense against Russia? Recent polls suggest that an overwhelming majority opposes relinquishing territory to Russia.\(^6\) Beyond this, we do not know how Ukrainians weigh different costs of the war, such as additional civilian and military fatalities or a risk of nuclear escalation. Do Ukrainians trade off these costs of armed self-defense against the chance to achieve an acceptable outcome? What is an acceptable war outcome given that Russian political or territorial control would have significant long-term costs, including the loss of Ukrainian lives. Seeking proportionality in war would involve weighing the consequences of alternative strategies and accepting potentially less desirable outcomes if it means reducing the costs of armed self-defense. A different way of thinking about self-defense is in categorical

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1Henry Kissinger quoted in Bella (2022).
2For a critique of these calls, see Gorobets (2022).
3Star (2022); Davis (2022); Lehming (2022).
4Bloomberg (2022); Post (2022).
5Noam Chomsky quoted in Eaton (2022); Alexander Lukashenko quoted in Al Jazeera (2022); it is contested whether Emanuel Macron asked Ukraine to concede to avoid escalation, see Politico (2022); see also Polenz (2022); Posen (2022).
6Polls in early May 2022 found that around 80% of surveyed Ukrainians opposed territorial concessions (Democratic Initiatives Foundation 2022; Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2022).
terms: some outcomes are unacceptable regardless of how costly the alternatives are. In this view, cost-benefit considerations should not prevent effective resistance against aggression (Walzer 2008, 91).

Ukrainians bear most of the direct costs of self-defense and the success of any strategy chiefly depends on their support. Whether and how they think about the proportionality of self-defense therefore ought to inform what strategy Ukraine is urged to pursue. Yet, the views of ordinary Ukrainians are absent from international debates about whether and how Ukraine should defend itself. To elevate Ukrainian voices in these debates, we fielded a conjoint survey experiment between 16th and 24th of July 2022 with 1,160 Ukrainian respondents in areas of Ukraine considered safe for face-to-face interviews. We asked respondents about their support for different political and military strategies in their fight against Russia over the next three months. These strategies randomly vary along five attributes: upfront territorial concessions, expected civilian fatalities, expected deaths among Ukrainian fighters, the risk of a nuclear attack against Ukraine, and the projected political outcome of the war, all after three more months of fighting.

We find that Ukrainians strongly prefer strategies that fully restore Ukraine’s political autonomy and territorial integrity. All three types of war costs - civilian fatalities, deaths among Ukrainian fighters, and the risk of a nuclear strike - depress support for a strategy, but have much smaller effects than territorial concessions and limits on political autonomy. Crucially, we find that Ukrainians do not trade off the costs of self-defense against its benefits as the principle of proportionality suggests. Instead, their responses show categorical opposition to compromising Ukraine’s political autonomy and conceding territory, even if this would reduce the costs of fighting Russia over the next three months. 79% of respondents never support strategies leading to a Russian-controlled government, regardless of the costs. Those 21% of respondents who accept a Russian-controlled government do so not to forgo costs, but because they prioritize territorial integrity. We find substantively

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7 The study was approved by the ethical review board of Oxford University and pre-registered with e-gap. The de-identified pre-analysis plan can be accessed here: https://osf.io/17b24.
larger effects of the immediate costs of war when limits on political autonomy and
territorial integrity are either excluded from a respondents’ choice set or invariant.
In contrast to public calls on Ukraine to surrender or negotiate, which often follow
the logic of proportionality, we find that Ukrainians take a categorical stance. They
prefer resisting aggression, regardless of the costs of fighting.

Cost-Benefit Calculations in War

Ukraine has a just cause for war against Russia. Just war theorists think of this
cause as a collective right to defend the nation (Floerke-Schied and Winright 2022;
Walzer 2022) or an individual right to life and political self-determination (McMa-
han 2022). The view from international law is equally clear: Ukraine is exercising
the state’s right of self-defense, a customary right, enshrined in Article 51 of the UN
Charter (Haque 2022). Yet, a war with a just cause may still be an unjust war. Most
moral philosophers believe that it can be morally wrong to pursue just self-defense
if victory is unlikely or the expected costs of fighting outweigh its benefits. In their
view, even defensive wars must be proportionate (Frowe 2015; Hurka 2005). An op-
posing position casts the permissibility of self-defense in categorical terms: some
outcomes are too awful to accept regardless of the costs of resisting them. When an
aggressive war threatens the survival of a nation, resistance is permissible regard-
less of the costs (Nagel 1979; Walzer 2008).8

We do not know how Ukrainians think about the costs and benefits of self-
defense against Russia, whether their attitudes toward the war follow the logic of
proportionality or whether they take a categorical stance on some possible out-
comes of Russia’s aggression. One might argue that public opinion is rarely a good
guide to political action, particularly when the stakes are high. Moreover, moral
realists hold that a particular strategy for Ukraine’s fight against Russia is either

8For a nuanced middle position, see Benbaji and Statman (2019, 98) who argue that the initial
decision to resort to self-defense must be proportionate but highlight the “impracticality of a constant
re-evaluation of the prudence and the morality of a given war.” Some international lawyers likewise
argue that proportionality should not undercut states’ effective self-defense (Dinstein 2017; Gardam
1993).
morally justified or not, a truth that is independent from what any human being thinks, including Ukrainians. Still, even moral realists have at least three reasons to better understand the preferences of ordinary Ukrainians. For anyone telling Ukrainians whether and how to defend themselves, these reasons are particularly urgent.

First, strategic choices in war are beset by factual and moral uncertainty. Will territorial concessions really save civilian lives? How should we trade off moral costs and benefits that come in the guise of seemingly incommensurable measures, such as keeping a territory intact and people alive? When the chance and costs of giving the wrong answer to a question are high, we have a strong reason to ask those who, given their insight and experience, are most likely to get the answer right (Raz 1986). If even they face significant odds of making the wrong decision, but doing nothing also has significant costs, we should ask those who bear the costs of a wrong answer (McMahan 2010, 53). In this war, the costs, both of fighting and of giving-up self-defense, are primarily, though not solely, borne by Ukrainians. We therefore have a moral reason to ask what they think.

Second, what counts as a benefit of armed self-defense is revealed partly by the preferences of ordinary Ukrainians. For instance, we cannot know how much weight to attribute to the benefit of a strategy that restores Ukraine’s political autonomy without understanding how much Ukrainians do not want to be governed by Russia. In a hypothetical alternative world in which many Ukrainians have only a weak preference against Russian control, the moral benefit of fully restoring Ukraine’s political autonomy would be less weighty than in a world in which Ukrainians strongly oppose Russian control. Ukrainians’ preferences are therefore an epistemic guide to the moral value of political autonomy and territorial integrity. Without understanding what Ukrainians think, we cannot soundly assess

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10 For many moral realists, the objective moral value of Ukraine’s political autonomy would depend only on its intrinsic features (Moore 2014; Sellars and Hospers 1953; Shafer-Landau 2003). Some moral realists would allow that this objective moral value is only intelligible as a value to Ukrainians (Railton 1986; Raz et al. 2005). In either view, Ukrainians’ preferences can be a good or even, the only, way of revealing the moral value of Ukraine’s political autonomy and territorial integrity.
any strategy for fighting Russia.

Third, even if we are unconcerned about morality, we have a political reason to understand how Ukrainians view the costs and benefits of self-defense. The success of any strategy depends partly on the support of the local population.\textsuperscript{11} If, hypothetically, Ukrainian leaders pursued a military strategy without limiting risks to Ukrainian fighters in order to recapture territory in the country’s East and the strategy deviated significantly from mass preferences, it would be less likely to succeed. Similarly, if Ukraine’s leadership sought a political settlement due to international pressure that concedes territory against the strong preferences of large swathes of the population, this settlement could destabilize the Ukrainian government and be of short duration.

In sum, it is morally neglectful, epistemically unsound, and politically unwise to judge Ukraine’s defensive war against Russia – and make political demands based on such judgements – without understanding how ordinary Ukrainians think about the costs and benefits of self-defense. Given the relevance of the question, we would expect existing literature to speak to it.

Studies investigating the attitudes of ordinary people toward the use of force have so far mostly focused on Western societies. They show negative effects of civilian and military fatalities on war support, which depend on the aims of a war (Jentleson and Britton 1998) and the perceived likelihood of its success (Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005). Indeed, U.S. respondents trade off deaths against the prospect of victory (Sagan and Valentino 2017). This suggests that Americans’ attitudes toward war reflect the logic of proportionality (Sagan and Valentino 2018, 2019) similar to respondents from other Western countries (Dill, Sagan and Valentino 2022).\textsuperscript{12} Importantly, however, Western publics have different stakes in the wars of choice they fight far from home compared to Ukrainians who are fighting a war of survival on their own soil.

\textsuperscript{11}The likelihood of a strategy to result in a stable outcome is, of course, also morally relevant.

\textsuperscript{12}For the fundamental point that moral considerations shape how ordinary people think about international affairs, see Kertzer et al. (2014).
Relatively few studies have directly investigated the attitudes of more comparable populations in active armed conflicts. They suggest that conflict-affected populations withdraw their support from parties that cause civilian deaths (Condra and Shapiro 2012; Kalyvas 2006; Schutte 2017), but this effect partly depends on which side in a war is responsible (Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013; Silverman 2019). Moreover respondents are more tolerant of civilian deaths if they agree with the aims of the party that causes them (Dill 2019). For our purposes, these studies have two crucial limitations. First, they do not show whether and how conflict-affected populations think about proportionality. Do they trade off the costs against the benefits of force like Western publics do? Second, existing studies mostly examine populations affected by civil wars. These may invoke qualitatively different stakes than an external aggression that threatens the territorial integrity and political survival of a nation which may be “indivisible” to citizens, thus precluding trade-offs (Fearon 1995).

Expectations

Determining whether and how Ukrainians think about the proportionality of self-defense is a three-step process. First, it requires assessing the projected “benefits” of self-defense. We understand “benefits” as outcomes that constitute an improvement over the status quo. Full self-defense would restore the pre-2014 politically autonomous and territorially intact Ukrainian state. While we know from recent polls that many Ukrainians oppose conceding territory, the question whether Ukrainians believe currently occupied areas, such as Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk, should be recaptured looms large. We expect that upfront concessions have a negative effect on Ukrainians’ support for a strategy. Moreover, Ukrainians are more likely to support conceding Crimea than conceding Crimea as well as the Donbas (Hypothesis 1).

Besides territorial integrity, Ukrainians are also fighting to restore their political autonomy. For some, a ceasefire and continued Russian influence in Ukraine
may be tolerable, while others may accept only a withdrawal of Russian troops as
successful self-defense. We expect that a ceasefire with a Russian-controlled gov-
ernment attracts less support than withdrawal of Russian forces. Moreover, we
expect that a Russian withdrawal with Ukrainian neutrality is less popular than a
Russian withdrawal with restoration of Ukraine’s full autonomy which opens the
possibility of pursuing NATO and EU memberships *(Hypothesis 2)*.

The second step in a proportionality judgement is a consideration of the ex-
pected costs of armed self-defense. Loss of life is the most salient cost of war.
We expect that a higher death toll among Ukrainian civilians *(Hypothesis 3)* and
more fatalities among Ukrainian fighters *(Hypothesis 4)* depress support for a strat-
egy. Traditional just war theory and international law distinguish between civil-
ians and combatants: civilians are immune from attack, but combatants contribute
to the war and are therefore liable to harming *(Walzer 2022)*. Revisionist just
war theorists, in contrast, emphasise that many combatants who fight in a defen-
sive war are not morally liable to harming either *(Fabre 2012; McMahan 2009)*. We
explore whether Ukrainian respondents, like traditionalists, prioritise sparing civil-
ians over sparing fighters, or whether they weigh these human costs of war equally,
as revisionists demand. Another cost that has been particularly salient in interna-
tional debates is the risk of nuclear escalation *(Polenz 2022; Ullman 2022)*. We ex-
pect that a higher risk of nuclear escalation has a negative effect on support for a
strategy *(Hypothesis 5)*.

Third, when the balance sheet of costs and benefits is drawn up, we must de-
terminw whether we think the bottom line is proportionate. The principle of pro-
portionality suggests the support-depressing effect of the expected costs should be
weaker the more beneficial the projected outcome is. If Ukrainians’ attitudes fol-
low the logic of proportionality, we therefore expect that the closer the projected
outcome of a strategy is to re-establishing Ukraine’s full political autonomy, the
more likely respondents are to accept higher civilian and military death tolls, and a

\[13\] For the argument that this distinction is “pernicious” in a war in which combatants on one side
defend themselves against aggression, see *Frowe (2022)*.
greater nuclear escalation risk (Hypothesis 6). Similarly, the fewer territorial conces-
sions a strategy involves, promising a re-establishment of Ukraine’s pre-2014 ter-
ritorial integrity, the weaker the support-depressing effect of costs in civilian and
military lives and nuclear risk (Hypothesis 7).

The logic of proportionality implies that Ukrainians support less than full
political autonomy or territorial integrity if this means reducing the costs of
fighting Russia. Proportionality therefore stands in stark contrast to thinking
about self-defense against aggression in categorical terms. When the survival of
the nation is at stake, it may feel wrong to allow the expectation of costs to get
in the way of effective resistance. Some outcomes, such as a Russian-controlled
government, might be perceived as categorically unacceptable, regardless of the
costs. In the ongoing war, a categorical stance could mean that Ukrainians priori-
tise the restoration of their political autonomy and territorial integrity regardless
of the costs, and take heed of minimizing fatalities and reducing the risk of nuclear
escalation only if a strategy is projected to have an acceptable outcome.

Research Design

To test our hypotheses, we conducted a face-to-face survey among 1’160 Ukraini-
ans between 16th and 24th of July 2022. The following sections present the design of
the conjoint survey experiment, our sampling procedure, details on the implemen-
tation of the survey, and our estimation strategy.

Survey design

We presented respondents with a short vignette, which asked them to “[p]lease
imagine that [Ukrainian] President Zelensky and his team are considering different
military-political strategies for pursuing the war over the next 3 months.”14 We
then showed respondents four pairs of strategies, eight strategies in total, each with

14See Appendix F for the full set of questions.
different predicted consequences after three additional months of fighting. For each pair, respondents first rated their support for the two strategies on a 6-point scale (score, rescaled to vary between 0 and 1) and, thereafter, made a forced choice between them (choice).

Table 1 shows the attributes and attribute levels of the conjoint profiles. The strategies vary according to upfront territorial concessions, expected civilian deaths, expected military deaths, the risk of a nuclear strike, and the projected political autonomy their outcome affords, all after three additional months of fighting. For each attribute, the levels reflect a range of values that the attribute can realistically take, considering the dynamics of the war in the months prior to the survey. For instance, we vary Ukrainian civilian and military fatalities between 6,000, 12,000, and 24,000, which is roughly half, the same, and twice the number of respective fatalities between February and July 2022. The attribute levels for the projected political outcome are likewise realistic in the sense that they have all been widely discussed as possible outcomes in both Ukrainian and international discourses.

As we asked individuals to express their views about a conflict they are currently experiencing, we took care to minimize the risk of re-traumatization (Wood 2006). While the survey inevitably reminds respondents of Russia’s violent aggression, we sought feedback from Ukrainian colleagues on our design to minimize the burden on respondents. Moreover, we opted against including scenarios that could be more distressing for respondents than the reality they are already facing, such as additional hypothetical territorial gains by Russia, vastly higher numbers of civilian deaths than seen in the first months of fighting, or a greater likelihood of a nuclear attack.

The strategies shown to respondents were drawn with a constant probability

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15 These rough estimates lie in the middle of a very range of reported fatality numbers for civilians and combatants, see for instance, OHCHR (2022), Habershon et al. (2022), and Santora and Bengali (2022).

16 We have not included “continuation of fighting” as an outcome as this would have been a treatment that bundles costs and benefits in indiscernible ways.
of 1/3 for each attribute level. We chose this uniform distribution as we have little indication of the real-world distribution of attributes of the Ukrainian government’s possible strategies (De la Cuesta, Egami and Imai 2022). To avoid overgeneralizing conclusions from the results from this particular uniform distribution, we estimate compositional effects through innovative subgroup analyses that produce fine-grained conclusions of attributes’ effects conditional on experimentally controlled values of and variance in other attributes. This advances our ability apply the results to real-world choices over any kind of Average Marginal Component Effects. To analyze order-effects, we randomize the order of attributes 2-4 at the level of respondents (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014). Because attributes 1 and 5 logically precedes (follows) attributes 2-4, we do not include them in the randomization. We find no evidence of systematic order effects (see Figure A6) which is in line with recent evidence on their practical irrelevance (Rudolph, Freitag and Thurner 2022).

**Sampling procedure**

Due to dynamic flight and migration of Ukrainians since Russia’s invasion, the survey included only respondents who, when surveyed, lived in the same place as on 23 February 2022. Moreover, while we include some regions (oblasti) that have been under (partial) Russian occupation but liberated by the Ukrainian army, we excluded Crimea and the regions of Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv from the survey because of ongoing fighting. The sampling strategy then followed a randomized, four-stage design in each included oblast to yield a sample that maximized its representativeness of the Ukrainian adult population given the current circumstances. First, the sample composition is proportional to the number of inhabitants 18 years and older in each region, retrieved from the last available electoral statistics from 2019. Second, we stratified voting precincts as our primary

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17 Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, Zhytomyr, and Chernihiv. Interviews were only conducted in Ukraine-controlled areas of Zaporizhzhia.

18 Telephone interviews via random dialing are not an option for completing complex conjoint tasks.
Table 1: Conjoint experiment: Attribute levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Upfront concessions</td>
<td>No concessions</td>
<td>Recognize Crimea as part of Russia</td>
<td>Recognize Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk regions as part of Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Projected number of civilian casualties in the next 3 months</td>
<td>Approximately 6,000 (About half of the total number of people killed so far)</td>
<td>Approximately 12,000 (The figure is close to the total number of people killed so far)</td>
<td>Approximately 24,000 (About twice the total number of people killed so far)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Projected number of military casualties in the next 3 months (Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Guard and Police, SSU Security Services of Ukraine, Territorial Defense, and volunteer battalions)</td>
<td>Approximately 6,000 (About half of the total number of people killed so far)</td>
<td>Approximately 12,000 (The figure is close to the total number of people killed so far)</td>
<td>Approximately 24,000 (About twice the total number of people killed so far)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Likelihood of a nuclear strike on Ukraine by Russia</td>
<td>None (0%)</td>
<td>Low (Approximately 5%)</td>
<td>Moderate (Approximately 10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Likely outcome after 3 months</td>
<td>Withdrawal of Russian troops and preservation of sovereignty (includes possibility to join the EU and/or NATO)</td>
<td>Withdrawal of Russian troops and negotiated neutral status of Ukraine (no possibility to join the EU and/or NATO)</td>
<td>A ceasefire and a Russian-controlled government in Kyiv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
sampling units (PSUs) according to their urban vs. rural status.\textsuperscript{19} Third, we randomly sampled a total of 120 PSUs across all strata (oblast $\times$ urban-rural) with a probability proportional to their size. Fourth, we randomly selected 10 addresses within each sampled PSU.\textsuperscript{20} If the respective household did not agree to be interviewed or did not feature a member of a specified sex and age quota, interviewers moved to the next household until the respective interview was completed.\textsuperscript{21} Sex and age quotas for each PSU were computed based on the last (pre-war) official statistics.

**Survey implementation**

Conducting face-to-face interviews in an active conflict theatre requires taking additional measures to ensure the safety of enumerators and respondents (Cronin-Furman and Lake 2018). Enumerators underwent three types of training: a general introduction to interviewing and fieldwork, a training specific to the survey and related fieldwork procedures with regional leaders, and a special training for each interviewer regarding the instructions of the survey. In line with the approved protocol of Oxford University’s ethical review board, enumerators sought the informed consent of respondents and allowed their withdrawal from the interview at any time. We furthermore assured our Ukrainian partners that failing to complete surveys due to security concerns would (and did) not have any monetary consequences for them, and that enumerator and respondent safety should always take precedence.

Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of our sample in (a), compared to the full set of violent events led by the Russian army and its proxies since February 2022 in (b). We initially planned to conduct 1’200 interviews across regions considered safe by our local partners. The survey company closely monitored the

\textsuperscript{19}PSUs under Russian or contested control in Zaporizhzhia were excluded from the sampling procedure.

\textsuperscript{20}Street, house number, apartment number.

\textsuperscript{21}The result of the household-based sampling is a potential overweighting of small households. Accounting for this pattern by re-weighting respondents does not substantively change our results, see Figure A2.
(a) Sampled locations
Note: 116 PSUs with 10 respondents each. PSU coordinates have been randomly displaced by up to .2 decimal degrees to ensure the anonymity of respondents.

(b) Battles, remote violence, and violence against civilians committed by the Armed Forces of Russia and their allies between 23rd February and 22nd July 2022.
Note: Data from Raleigh et al. (2010).

Figure 1: Survey sample and conflict events in Ukraine
situation while the survey was in the field, and each interviewer also recorded and reported any issues they faced when conducting the survey. After safety concerns were raised in Sumy, all 40 interviews in the region were immediately cancelled and dropped from the study. Interviews in the remaining oblasti were conducted without security concerns.

62% of successfully contacted households completed the survey. 22 We consider this a very high cooperation rate, given the difficult circumstances the Ukrainian population faces. Most refusals were registered at the household level (N = 507). Of the quota-identified respondents, 85 refused before any questions were asked and 59 refused to complete the interview. The latter non-completion rate of 4.8% is very small, particularly given the sensitivity of the survey. We tentatively conclude that respondents wanted to make their voices heard on this issue, as we had hoped. Two measures were used to control the quality of the survey. First, 44% of interviews were controlled either through a second visit or phone call by a controller. Second, GPS coordinates for all except two localities were checked and partial audio records were verified. All PSUs were covered using these procedures. 10 unconfirmed interviews were discovered, excluded from the data, and repeated.

**Estimation strategy**

The main quantity of interest to test Hypotheses 1 to 5 is the Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) of attribute levels to be interpreted as the effect of setting attribute $A$ to a target level on the probability of the average strategy to be selected against any other random strategy paired with it (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014; Bansak et al. 2020). We estimate the AMCE for attribute levels $l \in [2, 3]$ with level 1 as the baseline level for each attribute $a \in A$ by estimating a joint linear regression:

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22 Appendix A contains demographic summary statistics as well as a breakdown of various types of unsuccessful contact.

23 The remaining two localities lacked coverage, with coordinates entered via manual georeferencing.
\[ Y_{ips} = \alpha_0 + \sum_{a=1}^{A} \sum_{l=2}^{3} \beta_{al}[T_{ipsal} = 1] + \epsilon_{ips}, \]  

(1)

where \( Y_{ipsa} \) is either the choice or score of a strategy \( s \) in pair \( p \) by respondent \( i \). \( \alpha_0 \) denotes the intercept and \( T_{ipsal} \) is binary indicator of the attribute level \( a \) strategy is assigned to. Hence, \( \beta_{al} \) captures the AMCE for each attribute level of interest compared to the respective baseline levels. We cluster standard errors at the level of respondents to account for potential interdependence within subjects.

Acknowledging potential caveats of AMCE estimates due to attribute invariance in some pairs and compositional effects (Abramson, Koçak and Magazinnik 2019; Ganter 2021; Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2020), we additionally present marginal mean estimates adjusted for ties in attribute levels (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2020) below. These closely correspond to Ganter’s (2021) average component preferences as the number of attribute levels is constant across all attributes. In addition, we follow Abramson et al. (2020) and show that estimating the Average Feature Choice Probability results in very similar results (Appendix Figure A1).

To test Hypotheses 6 and 7 and assess heterogeneous effects, we estimate the following interaction model in which AMCEs are conditional on a sub-group indicator \( M \) with level \( k \in K \):

\[ Y_{ips} = \alpha_0 + \sum_{k=2}^{K} \beta_{k}[M_{ipsk} = 1] + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{a=1}^{A} \sum_{l=2}^{3} \beta_{alk}[T_{ipsa} = l][M_{ips} = k] + \epsilon_{ips}, \]  

(2)

which follows the notation of Eq. 1 while adding (1) constitutive terms for each level \( K - 1 \) of the sub-group indicator except a baseline level and (2) estimating the conditional AMCE (CAMCE) for each subgroup separately, with \( \beta_{alk} \) denoting the effect of attribute \( a \) at level \( l \) on the probability of a strategy being chosen among observations with \( M = k \). We follow Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2020) and conduct an omnibus test of differences in CAMCEs between subgroups which guards us again over-interpreting a few small and seemingly significant differences among a

\[ 24 \text{Appendix Figure A5 shows little substantive change when clustering instead on the strategy pair or not at all.} \]
large number of contrasts.\textsuperscript{25}

Results

In the following analysis, we first present strong evidence in favor of Hypotheses 1 to 5 by estimating substantive effects of the five attributes on support for a strategy which show little heterogeneity across respondent characteristics. We then turn to Hypotheses 7 and 6, pertaining to the principle of proportionality. While finding substantively meaningful and statistically significant AMCEs across all attributes, we find little support for the expectation that Ukrainians’ preferences resemble the principle of proportionality. Consequently, the final subsection presents substantive evidence that respondents’ choices reflect a categorical stance on self-defense against Russia.

Main estimates

Estimated AMCEs based on Eq. 1 yield strong support for Hypotheses 1 to 5 and show negative effects of territorial concessions, civilian and military deaths, nuclear escalation risk, as well as war outcomes that restrict Ukraine’s political autonomy on a respondents’ scoring and choice of strategies. However, the results plotted in Figure 2 also show substantive differences in the size of AMCEs: our “cost” attributes 2-4 have AMCEs that are up to six times smaller than the AMCEs of territorial concessions and restrictions on Ukraine’s political autonomy. Among the cost attributes 2 to 4, setting a strategy’s predicted number of civilian casualties over the next three months to 24’000 has the largest effect, decreasing its score by \(-0.024 [-0.04; -0.0084]\)\textsuperscript{26} and choice probability by \(-0.065 [-0.089; -0.041]\).\textsuperscript{27} In contrast, upfront concessions of Donbas and Crimea decrease these outcomes by

\textsuperscript{25}The test reformulates Eq. 2 and tests for the joint nullity of interaction terms that moderate $\beta_{al}$ coefficients from Eq. 1.

\textsuperscript{26}Square brackets contain 95% confidence intervals throughout.

\textsuperscript{27}We find no difference between the effects of civilian and military fatalities, suggesting that respondents weigh these human costs of war equally, in line with the demands of revisionist just war theory.
Figure 2: Self-defence, even at very high costs: Larger negative AMCEs of territorial concessions and sovereignty-restricting war outcomes than of civilian and military fatalities or nuclear risk.

Note: AMCE estimates result from Eq. 1.

-0.024 [-0.04; -0.0084] and -0.065 [-0.089; -0.041], respectively. The possibility of a Russian-controlled government elicits even stronger resistance, with an effect on both outcomes of -0.32 [-0.35; -0.3] and -0.36 [-0.38; -0.33], respectively.

We put these results into perspective by analysing average scores and choice probabilities of strategies with given attribute levels across all their appearances, excluding ties. Plotting such marginal means, Figure 3 confirms that the three outcomes for Ukraine’s political autonomy move respondents’ average choices along the better part of the range of the outcomes. While the average rating for all strategies that are predicted to result in full political autonomy amounts to a score of 0.45 [0.44; 0.47], this reduces to 0.13 [0.12; 0.14] for the average strategy with a

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28 We drop profiles with invariant levels on a given attribute from this analysis to prevent bias. Differences between marginal means therefore correspond to the above presented AMCEs adjusted for the rate of co-occurrence (see Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2020).
Figure 3: Little support for territorial concessions and loss of sovereignty: Marginal means

Note: Marginal means for the forced choice outcome drop pairs with no variance on a given attribute to avoid bias.
predicted takeover of the Ukrainian government by Russia. Even more starkly, the
average choice rate changes from 74 [72; 76] to 21 [19; 23] percent. The range of
marginal means for differing levels of concessions is smaller yet still substantive.
Respondents chose “no concession” strategies in 67 [64; 69] percent of all relevant
pairs, while they conceded Donbas and Crimea only at a rate of 21 [19; 23] per-
cent. In comparison, respondents choose strategies with low and high numbers
of civilian fatalities in a small range of 54 [52; 56] and 45 [43; 47] percent of tasks,
respectively. This range is even smaller for different levels of military fatalities and
nuclear risk.

These results provide first evidence that Ukrainians’ overriding preference is to
avoid limits on political autonomy and territorial concessions. Their concern for
the loss of lives and nuclear risk is much weaker. Even though we did not treat
respondents with even higher levels of death and destruction in the experiment
for reasons of realism and ethics, we can still extrapolate our results to estimate
likely points of equivalence between AMCEs of various attributes. To that end, we
exploit the fact that the levels of attributes 2 to 4 constitute logarithmic (attributes
2 and 3) and linear (attribute 3) scales. Assuming that respondents’ preferences are
proportional to our scales, this allows us to derive an estimate of the level of an
attribute (e.g., civilian fatalities) that would yield the same AMCE as, for example,
the concession of Donbas and Crimea.

Table 2: Linear extrapolation of AMCEs

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Concessions</th>
<th>War outcomes</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Civl. fatal.</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>(millions)</td>
<td>[0.033, 0.38]</td>
<td>[0.078, 2.2]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milit. fatal.</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(millions)</td>
<td>[0.039, 1.3]</td>
<td>[0.096, 14]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear risk</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percent)</td>
<td>[5.3, 72]</td>
<td>[10, 100]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 We show below that such concessions are caused by respondents’ priority for political autonomy
rather than costs in the respective tasks.
Table 2 shows the result of this computation for attributes 2 to 4 paired with each the two levels of concessions and political war outcomes. Extrapolating our AMCE estimates for civilian fatalities in the first row and column suggests that treating respondents with a death toll of 110 thousand civilians over three months would likely yield an AMCE of the same size as the effect of conceding Crimea upfront. This would amount to 1’200 civilian deaths/day or roughly ten times the daily average in the first months of the war. The estimated fatalities treatment that would yield an AMCE similar to that of giving up Donbas and Crimea amounts to 410 thousand military fatalities in comparison. With regard to restrictions on political autonomy, Table 2 suggests that a treatment of 75’000 civilian fatalities would generate an effect equivalent to that of negotiated neutrality. Equating the AMCE of the worst outcome of the war, Russian control of the Ukrainian government, would in turn necessitate treating individuals with an estimated 12 million Ukrainian civilian casualties—a staggering figure well beyond current risk assessments or morally defensible conjoint treatments. The corresponding estimates for military fatalities and nuclear risk treatments follow the same pattern.

In sum, extrapolating the AMCEs of the cost attributes reveals that the average respondent of our survey would only be willing to give up on full territorial integrity and political autonomy to avoid costs of armed self-defense over the next three months that are orders of magnitude beyond current assessments. Further supporting the primacy of respondents’ concern for political autonomy and territorial integrity over their concern for the costs of the war is the fact that our main estimates are very robust to permutations of the model specification. In particular, our results are consistent when (1) estimating a logistic regression of the forced choice outcome, (2) modelling attribute levels as continuous rather than categorical, (3) weighting respondents by the probability of inclusion into the sample which depends on their household size, and (4) accounting for attributes’ ordering. As presented in Appendix B, none of these changes affect the results substantively.
Effect heterogeneity

While the direction of preferences is likely the same for an overwhelming majority of respondents, their preference intensity may still vary substantively. If this were the case, some of our estimates might be driven by potentially small subsets of respondents (Abramson, Koçak and Magazinnik 2019), for example, those most severely affected by the war. We systematically test for heterogeneous treatment effects along respondents’ (1) demographic characteristics, (2) affectedness by the war indicated by self-reports and spatial proximity to violence committed by the Russian army and its proxies, as well as (3) self-reported attitudes toward the war and the nation. Of the 19 variables we test, only 6 are associated with statistically significant heterogeneity in AMCEs ($p < .05$, Bonferroni adjusted).

With the full results presented in Appendix C, we find that demographics barely affect our results with the exception of ethno-linguistic characteristics. Respondents who answered the survey in Russian or are native Russian-speakers exhibit smaller, yet substantively negative and statistically significant, AMCEs of the territorial integrity and political autonomy items. This shows that differences in the customarily spoken language correlate with differences in preference intensity but not direction, thus contradicting simplistic arguments about linguistically aligned support for Russia and its war aims. This finding corresponds to research showing a growing relevance of national attachment and civic rather than ethnic identities among Ukrainian Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians since the Euromaidan and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Barrington 2021; Kulyk 2019; Pop-Eleches and Robertson 2018).

We furthermore find some evidence of effect heterogeneity in the level of affectedness by the war. Respondents in regions substantively affected by active fighting in being amongst those first attacked during Russia’s February invasion or those who live within 10 kilometers of locations of one-sided violence, bat-

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30See Appendix A for summary statistics on the variables.
31In particular, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Kyiv region and city, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Odesa.
tles, and remote shelling by the Russian army as recorded by Raleigh et al. (2010) tend to exhibit smaller (yet still substantive) AMCEs on the territorial integrity and political autonomy items. Reports of self-affectedness or family members’ affect- edness do not significantly moderate the results. Importantly, affected respondents do not exhibit stronger (or weaker) AMCEs of the three cost attributes. This provides at least suggestive evidence that a sample including respondents from the unsurveyed Eastern oblasti would not have yielded starkly dissimilar results.

Lastly, political attitudes expressed toward the end of the survey correlate with AMCEs. For one, respondents who think that the survival of the Ukrainian nation is not at stake in the war (N=553) exhibit consistently smaller, yet still size- able, negative AMCEs of the integrity and autonomy attributes. More importantly, the very few respondents who do not think winning the war is “extremely impor- tant” (N=88) and those who do not trust the president (N=143) exhibit substan- tively smaller AMCEs of limitations to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political autonomy while seeing no different AMCEs on the cost attributes. Yet even in these small and overlapping “opposition” subgroups, we find strong and statistically sig- nificant resistance to strategies with a Russian-controlled government (CAMCEs of -0.15 [-0.26; -0.03] and -0.16 [-0.24; -0.075], respectively). These results therefore show that even respondents who are unaligned with the current government reject limits to Ukraine’s political autonomy.

Probing proportionality

We test whether respondents’ scores and choices reflect the logic of proportion- ality (Hypotheses 6 and 7) by estimating Eq. 2 for sub-groups in our data defined by values of the territorial integrity and political autonomy attributes. If respondents’ reactions to strategies followed a logic of proportionality, the negative CAMCEs of cost attributes would increase in size as strategies exhibit higher infringements on territorial integrity and political autonomy. In other words, the logic of proportionality suggests that respondents should be willing to tolerate more death and
destruction in exchange for better outcomes of the war or, in turn, would accept less desirable outcomes to save costs.

We find no support for this expectation. Figure 4 shows estimated CAMCEs for sub-groups defined by the attribute levels of territorial integrity and political autonomy assigned to a strategy. The results show that CAMCEs barely vary between sub-groups defined along both indicators. Overall, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no differences between sub-group preferences with any reasonable certainty (p-values of .51 and .17, respectively). Given the high number of contrasts and ensuing risk of false positive discoveries, this result strongly advocates against a substantive interpretation of the few, if at all small, and mostly statistically insignificant differences between CAMCEs in Figure 4. We therefore reject our expectation that attitudes follow a logic of proportionality.

**Exploring categorical decision-making**

Rather than trading off the costs against the benefits of self-defense, respondents may take a categorical stance on the defensive war against Russia. A categorical logic implies a clear ranking of (un)desirable features so that a strategy characterized by the most resisted (desired) feature $f_1$ across all attributes and levels is rejected (accepted) **irrespective of the values of all lower-ranked features**. Choices over strategies in a pair are only determined by other features if $f_1$ characterizes either none or both strategies in the pair. In such cases, respondents’ decision is guided by the categorical reaction to the second-ranked feature $f_2$, etc. While such decision-making does not contradict the assumptions underlining the use of conjoint experiments and the estimation of AMCEs (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014), the latter yield only limited insights into them as they average over

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32 Because the latter are fully randomized, differences between the CAMCEs of one attribute level are equivalent to the Average Marginal Interaction Effect and can be causally interpreted. We choose to report CAMCEs for reasons of readability and report AMCIEs in Appendix D.

33 Results for the score outcome in Appendix Figure A16 show consistent patterns for attributes 2 to 4. Because of ceiling effects, ACMEs on the for score of limitations to political authority **decrease** with limitations to territorial integrity, and vice-versa.

34 This logic does not affect the rating of strategies in a pair as respondents can rank them independently of each other.
Figure 4: No evidence for proportionality: Stable effects of cost attributes 2-4 across levels of territorial integrity and political autonomy.

Note: CAMCE sub-group estimates follow Eq. 2.
preference directions and intensities (Abramson, Koçak and Magazinnik 2019), the latter of which are very high\(^{35}\) for highly-ranked features in categorical decision-making.

Based on our main results and going beyond our pre-analysis plan, we expect that forced choice patterns in our data are consistent with categorical reactions to (restrictions on) Ukraine’s political autonomy and territorial integrity as the highest-ranked features. Consequently, we expect that the effects of cost attributes on forced choices increase in pairs with invariant integrity and autonomy attributes. We find very strong and statistically significant (F-statistic = 15)\(^{36}\) support for this conjecture. Figure 5 shows that the effects of higher civilian and military fatalities as well as nuclear risk increase substantively in the 466 strategy pairs with invariant attributes 1 and 5, reaching an CAMCE of .2 at attribute level 3 for all three attributes.\(^{37}\) Because the occurrence of invariance in both attributes is random, these increases are causally identified.

These differences are not the mechanical result of suppressing variance in just any two attributes. The differences between the subgroups in Figure 5 are substantively larger than those resulting from differences between CAMCEs in subgroups defined by (in)variance in any other pair of attribute. The latter yield a maximum F-statistic of 5.9, arising from a split by (no) variance in attributes 3 and 5. Splitting by (in)variance in pairs of cost attributes 2 to 4 does not produce any significant differences in AMCEs, with F-statistics of 1.8 and smaller, thus further showing that respondents are primarily concerned for political autonomy and territorial integrity.

While Figure 5 shows responsiveness to the costs of the war once respondents have no choice between differing levels of “benefits,” the above analysis produces no insights into the relative ranking of autonomy and integrity features. This is mostly because the AMCEs abstract from the overall support for baseline levels,

\(^{35}\)Potentially infinite, if preferences are wholly inelastic.

\(^{36}\)From an omnibus Wald-test no differences between the ‘variant’ and ‘invariant’ subgroups.

\(^{37}\)The CAMCEs of integrity and authority attributes naturally reduces to 0 in pairs in which these do not vary.
Figure 5: Sub-group analysis by (no) variation in levels of attributes 1 and 5 within a pair.

Note: Sub-group CAMCE estimates following Eq. 2.

which can be highly-ranked features themselves (see also Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2020).

To delineate a full feature ranking, we develop a new heuristic approach that increases the depth of causal analysis of conjoint data over previous methods. We start choosing the first-ranked attribute feature as that with the highest predictive power over respondents’ choices. We do so by choosing the feature with a marginal mean closest to either 0 or 1, since marginal means directly correspond to the predictive accuracy of a simple prediction that assigns $\hat{Y}_{psa} = 1$ if $T_{psa} > .5$ and $\hat{Y}_{psa} = 0$ otherwise.\(^{38}\)

Once the first-ranked feature $f_1$ is delineated, we identify the second-ranked feature, now using only strategy pairs in our data in which $f_1$ is either absent or

\(^{38}\)If marginal means are estimated from forced-choice data without invariant strategy pairs, they equate the true positive and negative rate of the described prediction. If the data includes invariant pairs, marginal means need to be adjusted for the rate of such pairs (see also Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2020, fn. 4).
invariant, so that no respondent will have made decisions on its basis. For this
subset of our data we re-estimate marginal means for all features except invariant
\( f_1 \) to delineate the second-ranked feature \( f_2 \) in the same manner as above. Again
only keeping pairs without (variation in) \( f_2 \), we proceed in the same manner until
we have ranked all features. We compute bootstrapped standard errors clustered
at the level of respondents to capture the uncertainty of the feature ranking.

Figure 6 presents the results of this analysis until the fourth-ranked feature\textsuperscript{39}, all
of which coincide with our previous results. Its first column presents the marginal
means computed over the entire dataset, clearly and without uncertainty identifying
the first-ranked feature \( f_1 \) as Russian controlled government, chosen in only 21
\([19; 23]\) percent of cases. 21 percent acceptance of a Russian controlled government
may seem substantive and could be indicative of some respondents trading it off
against lower costs of war. Yet, zooming in on the respective choices shows that the
respective acceptances are caused \textit{exclusively} by rejections of territorial concessions
(Appendix Figure A19).

In the next step (column 2), we drop all strategy pairs that exhibit variation in \( f_1 \).
In the remaining sample (N=5008), full territorial integrity reaches an acceptance
rate of 72 \([69; 74]\) percent, thus being the second-ranked feature \( f_2 \). The 28 percent
rejections are for the most part caused by respondents’ rejection of neutrality over
full political autonomy with small and mostly insignificant effects of cost attributes
(Figure A19).

Dropping the pairs with varying \( f_2 \) in column 3 yields the largest mean for re-
jection of acceptance of full political autonomy \([70 [66; 74]\) percent) vs. negotiated
neutrality. Because only two political autonomy attribute levels remain, both have
rank 3 \([3;4]\).\textsuperscript{40} Its confidence interval is overlapping with rank 4 \([3;8]\), conditional
acceptance of giving up only Crimea (column 4; mean of 66 \([61; 71]\) percent) vs.
giving up Crimea and Donbas. These two features are ranked with substantial
uncertainty due to the rapidly decreasing sample size (N = 1632) and increased

\textsuperscript{39}See Table A6 for a summary of the full ranking which becomes uncertain at ranks above 4.
\textsuperscript{40}This is because we cannot differentiate between rejections of one and acceptance of the other.
CAMCEs of the cost attributes. In sum, these ranking estimates then reaffirm that concerns over political autonomy and territorial integrity significantly override respondents’ sensitivity to the costs of the war.

Yet, a focus on the substantively increasing spread in marginal means of the attribute levels of civilian and military fatalities as well as nuclear risk reiterates the earlier finding that respondents are far from oblivious to the costs of the war. To the contrary, once their primary concerns over the reestablishment of the 2014 status quo ante find no reflection in the choice set they are presented with (column 5), our results show that respondents overwhelmingly select strategies that lead to no nuclear risk in 70 [%64; 76] percent of tasks and seldomly select strategies that lead to high levels of civilian and military fatalities.41

Beyond substantiating our argument that Ukrainians’ choices of war-fighting strategies are congruent with a categorical rejection of limits on political autonomy and territorial integrity, these findings have methodological implications for the evaluation of conjoint experiments. Our analysis shows that the co-occurrence rate of features over which respondents hold inelastic preferences affects estimates of ACMEs, marginal means, and related quantities for other features in theoretically meaningful ways.42 The ranking-based disaggregation pursued here offers one way to analyze such patterns and draw substantive conclusions from them.

41The implied CAMCEs are consistent with those presented in Figure 5 adjusted for the rate of co-occurrence of attribute levels.
42This finding is related to Abramson, Koçak and Magazinnik’s (2019) point that the inclusion of important attributes changes AMCEs for other attributes. It is furthermore already known that the rate of co-occurrence of attribute levels affects their own AMCE estimates (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2020, Ganter 2021).
Figure 6: Ranking the importance of strategy features in categorical decision-making. Marginal means of forced choice among attribute levels in nested subsets of the sample in which higher-ranked features do not vary.

Note: Column header identifies the feature and its rank used to identify the subset to be dropped in comparison to the previous column to the left, the remaining number of strategies in the sample, as well as the F-statistic of a Wald-test of no difference between the estimates in that and the previous column. Marginal means are computed after dropping pairs with no variance on a given attribute to avoid bias.
Conclusion

Most moral philosophers agree that even a war with a just cause like self-defense is only justified if the costs of fighting do not exceed the benefits. Attitudes toward war among many Western publics follow this logic of proportionality which trades off the costs against the “benefits” of war. The loud chorus of statesmen, scholars, and pundits, calling on Ukraine to settle for less than full political autonomy and territorial integrity to limit the costs of armed self-defense reflects a similar logic. This study showed that Ukrainians overwhelmingly prefer strategies that do not concede territory or limit Ukraine’s political autonomy. Their average responses suggest that Ukrainians are sensitive to the costs of armed self-defense, but only if they are choosing between strategies that have acceptable outcomes. None of the costs we asked respondents to contemplate in this study exceeded the value that political autonomy and full territorial integrity have to them.

One might think that these findings mean that Ukrainians’ attitudes toward the costs and benefits of self-defense follow the logic of proportionality, but the benefits of full self-defense are much weightier for Ukrainians than for the outside observers that call for concessions now. How weighty? Our extrapolation from the treated attribute levels suggests that the average effect of a Russian-controlled government on the rate of rejection is, to our respondents, equivalent to accepting 12 million additional civilian deaths, more military fatalities than the country has inhabitants, or a certain nuclear attack. The effect of conceding Donbas and Crimea to Russia is equivalent to the extrapolated effect of accepting 410 thousand additional civilian deaths, 1.2 million military fatalities, or a 58% chance of a nuclear strike against Ukraine. This extreme cost-inelasticity points to a more radical divergence of Ukrainians’ attitudes from the logic of proportionality that animates many observers than merely a different weighing of costs and benefits.

Instead, our results suggest that when a nation’s survival is threatened, attitudes toward the use of force may follow a different, a categorical, logic. We find no significant interactions between the expected costs and projected benefits of

31
armed self-defense. Instead 79% of respondents reject strategies with a Russian-
controlled government as the projected outcome, regardless of the costs. Respond-
dents who accept strategies with this projected outcome do so to reject territorial
concessions, not to save costs. Respondents appear to have a clear preference rank-
ing among the outcomes they accept; they overwhelmingly prioritize avoiding a
Russian-controlled government and then embrace any outcome with full territorial
integrity. We estimate that avoiding neutrality instead of full political autonomy
and avoiding conceding Donbas and Crimea versus Crimea alone are ranked third
and fourth, followed by concerns over costs of war. A large majority of our re-
pondents thus prefer resisting threats to the survival of the nation, regardless of
the costs. Michael Walzer (2008, p. 91), is one of few moral philosophers to have
given voice to this position, stating that “it is our abhorrence of aggression that is
authoritative here, while the maxim ... of proportionality play[s] only [a] marginal
and uncertain role[...].”43

What are the implications of the finding that ordinary Ukrainians do not view
the costs and benefits of self-defense in terms that resemble a proportionality calcu-
lation, but in terms of categorically avoiding Russian political control and restoring
their territorial integrity? We do not argue that Ukraine’s allies must support a
quest for self-defense at all costs. After all, armed self-defense, specifically if it
creates a risk of nuclear escalation, can have severe consequences for people be-
yond Ukraine. Yet, we argue that it is morally dubious to disregard the prefer-
ences of those who bear the immediate costs of territorial or political concessions
and that Ukrainians’ preferences are a valid epistemic guide to the moral value of
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political autonomy. Our findings should there-
fore cause outside observers to recalibrate their judgements of the proportionality
of Ukraine’s armed self-defense. Our findings also suggest more urgency in devel-
oping strategies that reduce the costs of achieving outcomes that Ukrainians can
live with.

43See also Benbaji (2008, 493) who argues that “the stringency of the proportionality constraint
might be sensitive to the justice of the ultimate goal of the war.”
Making demands on Ukraine’s political elites that are entirely divorced from Ukrainian mass preferences is also politically unwise. Commentators calling on Ukraine to make concessions tend to be confident that they come from a position of hard-headed realism. John Mearsheimer, for instance, reminds Ukrainians that they do not have “any agency by themselves to stop this war” and that “Ukrainians do[...] not really have much choice but to accommodate the Russians to a large extent”. Barry Posen (2022) recently warned that “Ukraine and the West should . . . shift from a strategy of winning the war toward a more realistic approach . . . that ends the fighting.” These positions assume that the “benefits” of war are divisible and therefore amenable to bargaining. Issue-indivisibility, in turn, is deemed “empirically implausible” (Fearon 1995, p. 389). While territory or political autonomy are not intrinsically indivisible, our findings show that ordinary Ukrainians view them as just that. This casts doubt over the position that is it “realistic” to demand that Ukraine concedes to save costs. In his call for granting concessions to Russia, Noam Chomsky famously exhorted Ukraine and its Western allies to “pay attention to the reality of the world” (Star 2022). That reality must include how Ukrainians think about the costs and benefits of self-defense.

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44 John Mearsheimer cited it Post (2022).
References


Supplementary Material

At Any Cost:
How Ukrainians Think about the Proportionality of Self-Defense

Table of Contents

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<td>E</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Survey questionnaire (English/Ukrainian)</td>
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### A Data

Table A1: Survey non-response

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<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
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<td>Complete</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household-level refusal</td>
<td>507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known-respondent refusal</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break off/ Implicit refusal</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unable to enter building</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one at residence</td>
<td>1020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent unavailable during field period</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased respondent</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household-level language problem</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent language problem</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business, government office, other organizations</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant housing unit</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota filled</td>
<td>148</td>
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Table A2: Respondent-level summary statistics: Demographics

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<td>40-49</td>
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<td>60+</td>
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<td>378</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic deprivation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural / Urban</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native language</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>1078</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A3: Respondent-level summary statistics: Affectedness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>East vs. West</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oblast first attacked</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self war-affected</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family war-affected</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Any oneside violence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Any battles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Any shelling</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A4: Respondent-level summary statistics: Political attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ukr. nation at stake</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Importance of victory</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremely important</td>
<td>1072</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust in president</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### B Robustness checks of main analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 vs. 2</th>
<th>1 vs. 3</th>
<th>2 vs. 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full integrity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minus Crimea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minus Donbas &amp; Crimea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6'000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12'000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24'000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6'000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12'000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24'000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None (0%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate (10%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiated neutrality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian-controlled government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure A1: Average Feature Choice Probabilities**

Note: Following Abramson et al. (2020), each column compares the predicted probabilities of respondents choosing a strategy with levels a and b on a given attribute as indicated in the column header among pairs that only include strategies with the respective attribute levels.
Figure A2: AMCEs estimated from the weighted sample
Note: AMCEs estimated from a weighted sample in which each respondents receives a weight proportional to their household size, thus giving more weight to respondents from large household, who had a lower chance of being sampled than to those from small households.

Figure A3: Average linear attribute effects
Note: Estimates from a linear regression of attribute levels (taken as linear, rather than categorical) on the score and choice outcomes.
Figure A4: AMCEs of all attributes on the **choice** outcome estimated by logistic regression
Figure A5: Clustering standard errors not at all, on the level of pairs, respondents, and PSUs.

Note: Conditional AMCEs computed based on splitting the sample into 3 groups for each attribute 2 to 4, depending on that attributes position (2 to 4) in a given interview. The ordering of attribute 2 to 4 was randomized at the level of respondents.
Figure A6: No Evidence for Order Effects

Note: Conditional AMCEs computed based on splitting the sample into 3 groups for each attribute 2 to 4, depending on that attributes position (2 to 4) in a given interview. The ordering of attribute 2 to 4 was randomized at the level of respondents.
## C Heterogeneous treatment effects

Table A5: Omnibus Wald-Test Result for Joint Nullity of Heterogenous Effects by Moderator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moderator</th>
<th>Score (0-1)</th>
<th>Forced choice (0/1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-Stat</td>
<td>p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex: Male / Female</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (5 groups)</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children: yes/no</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic deprivation</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural / Urban</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview language</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native language</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affectedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East vs. West</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oblast first attacked</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self war-affected</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family war-affected</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any oneside violence</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any battles</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any shelling</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political attitudes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukran. nation at stake</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of victory</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in president</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Adjusted p-values based on a Bonferroni adjustment for 38 hypotheses.

### C.1 Ethno-linguistic characteristics
Figure A7: Heterogeneity by language of the interview.

Note:
Figure A8: Heterogeneity by respondents’ native language.

Note:
C.2 Affectedness by the war

Figure A9: Heterogeneity by regions directly affected by active fighting.

Note:
Figure A10: Heterogeneity by regions directly affected by active fighting.

Note:
Figure A11: Heterogeneity by regions directly affected by active fighting.

Note:
Figure A12: Heterogeneity by regions directly affected by active fighting.

Note:
C.3 Political attitudes

Figure A13: Heterogeneity by respondents’ assessment of personal importance of Ukraine’s victory over Russia.

Note:
Figure A14: Heterogeneity by respondents’ assessment of the effect of loosing the war on the survival of the Ukrainian nation

Note:
Figure A15: Heterogeneity by respondents’ trust in the Ukrainian president

Note:
Figure A16: No evidence for proportionality: Stable effects of cost attributes 2-4 across levels of territorial integrity and political autonomy. Likely because of ceiling effects respondents react less strongly to Attribute 5 at high values of Attribute 1 and vice-versa.

Note: CAMCE sub-group estimates follow Eq. 2.
Figure A17: Average marginal component interaction effects on choice outcomes.
Figure A18: Average marginal component interaction effects on score outcomes.
## E Ranking analysis

Table A6: Ranking of Strategy Features

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>q2.5</th>
<th>q50</th>
<th>q97.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Political autonomy</td>
<td>Russian-controlled government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Territorial integrity</td>
<td>Full integrity</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Political autonomy</td>
<td>Full autonomy</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Political autonomy</td>
<td>Negotiated neutrality</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Territorial integrity</td>
<td>minus Donbas &amp; Crimea</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Territorial integrity</td>
<td>minus Crimea</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nuclear risk</td>
<td>None (0%)</td>
<td>5.65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Civilian fatalities</td>
<td>24’000</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Military fatalities</td>
<td>24’000</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Military fatalities</td>
<td>6’000</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Military fatalities</td>
<td>12’000</td>
<td>8.64</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nuclear risk</td>
<td>Moderate (10%)</td>
<td>8.92</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Nuclear risk</td>
<td>Low (5%)</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Civilian fatalities</td>
<td>6’000</td>
<td>9.01</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Civilian fatalities</td>
<td>12’000</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Mean, and quantiles q2.5, q50, and q97.5 from bootstrapped confidence intervals.
Figure A19: Marginal means of forced choice outcome computed within ranks, i.e. in non-nested subsets of the sample in which only the ranked feature and none of the higher-ranked features varies.

Note: The figure discerns marginal means of all attributes in choices among features $f_x$ in pairs in which higher ranked features $f_{x,c_x}$ are absent or invariant. The marginal Column header identifies the feature and its rank used to identify the subset of the data used for estimation. Column 3, for example, is only based on pairs in which Russian-controlled government and full territorial integrity are either absent of invariant while negotiated neutrality varies. Marginal means are computed after dropping pairs with no variance on a given attribute to avoid bias.
F  Survey questionnaire (English/Ukrainian)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Upfront concessions</td>
<td>No concessions</td>
<td>Recognize Crimea as part of Russia</td>
<td>Recognize Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk regions as part of Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Projected number of civilian casualties in the next 3 months</td>
<td>Approximately 6,000 (About half of the total number of people killed so far)</td>
<td>Approximately 12,000 (The figure is close to the total number of people killed so far)</td>
<td>Approximately 24,000 (About twice the total number of people killed so far)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Projected number of military casualties in the next 3 months</td>
<td>Approximately 6,000 (Approximately half of the total number of people killed so far)</td>
<td>Approximately 12,000 (The figure is close to the total number of people killed so far)</td>
<td>Approximately 24,000 (About twice the total number of people killed so far)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Likelihood of a nuclear strike on Ukraine by Russia</td>
<td>None (0%)</td>
<td>Low (Approximately 5%)</td>
<td>Moderate (Approximately 10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Likely outcome after 3 months</td>
<td>Withdrawal of Russian troops and preservation of Ukraine’s sovereignty (includes possibility to join the EU and/or NATO)</td>
<td>Withdrawal of Russian troops and negotiated neutral status of Ukraine (no possibility to join the EU and/or NATO)</td>
<td>A ceasefire and a Russian-controlled government in Kyiv</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In which language is it most convenient for the respondent to talk to you:
Ukrainian
Russian
The same, but he/she speaks Ukrainian more often
It is hard to say – he/she answers in Ukrainian
The same but he/she speaks Russian more often
It is hard to say – he/she answers in Russian

Hello, my name is (INTRODUCE YOURSELF). I am a representative from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Our organization is an independent professional organization that conducts sociological surveys.

We are currently conducting a population survey to study public opinion about current events in Ukraine. For this survey, we randomly selected, like in a lottery, more than a thousand Ukrainian citizens. The research was commissioned by the Ilko Kucheriv Foundation "Democratic Initiatives" and researchers from [redacted] University with the aim of studying political attitudes in Ukraine.

We guarantee your anonymity, as well as the confidentiality of your answers. Your answers will be entered into the computer together with the answers of other respondents, and the results of the survey will be used only in a generalized form.

We fully guarantee the confidentiality of your answers. In order for the results of this research to truly reflect the views of the entire population of Ukraine, it is important for us that you answer our questions.

That is why I am asking you to spare me about 10-15 minutes for a conversation, and I thank you in advance for your cooperation.

Until February 24, 2022, that is, before the full-scale Russian invasion, did you live in the same settlement or in another?
In the same
In another
How many adult citizens, over 18 years of age, have permanently resided and currently reside with you, not taking into account those who moved to you after February 23, 2022? Please write down the number of permanent residents.

__________

Gender of the selected respondent:
Male
Female
Other (write)
I do not want to answer

Age of the selected respondent:
Enter a number:

1. Marital Status:
Single/Unmarried
Married (officially registered marriage)
Officially single/unmarried, but living together (civil marriage)
Divorced
We are not officially divorced, but we live separately
Widower/widow
Other (write)

2. Do you have children?
No children
1 child
2 children
3 children
4 children or more

3. Your education
Basic general secondary education
Complete general secondary education
Vocational and technical education
Secondary special education
Higher Education

4. How would you describe your current financial situation?
Barely make ends meet, not enough money for even for the necessary products
Enough for food and for the purchase of necessary inexpensive things
In general, there is enough for life, but not enough funds to purchase durable things, such as furniture, a refrigerator, a TV
I live secured, but not yet able to make some significant purchases due to a lack of funds (buy an apartment, car, etc.)
I can buy almost anything I want
Difficult to answer/Refusal to answer

5. What language do you consider to be your native language?
Ukrainian
Russian
Other (write)
Difficult to answer
6. Who are you by nationality (your ethnicity)?
- Ukrainian
- Russian
- Polish
- Hungary
- Belarusian
- Romanian
- Slovakian
- Moldavian
- Other (write)
- Difficult to answer

7. What factors, in your opinion, make you a representative of the selected ethnic group? (Select all that apply)
- Tradition, ethnicity of my parents, grandparents
- Language
- Culture and traditions of my ethnic group
- Religion of my ethnic group
- Place/region of residence
- Feeling the shared history of my ethnic group
- Citizenship
- Personal choice of ethnicity
- Other (write)
- Difficult to answer

8. What is the nationality of your husband (wife)/partner?
- Ukrainian
- Russian
- Polish
- Hungarian
- Belarusian
- Romanian
- Slovakian
- Moldavian
- I do not have a husband/wife or partner
- Other (write)
- Difficult to answer
Please imagine that President Zelensky and his team are considering different military-political strategies for pursuing the war over the next 3 months. We will show you four pairs of strategies (8 strategies in total) with different predicted consequences after a 3-month period. We would like you to indicate each time how much you support or do not support the implementation of Strategy 1 or Strategy 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strategy 1</th>
<th>Strategy 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Upfront concessions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Projected number of civilian casualties in the next 3 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Projected number of military casualties in the next 3 months (Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Guard and Police, SSU Security Services of Ukraine, Territorial Defense, and volunteer battalions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Likelihood of a nuclear strike on Ukraine by Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Likely outcome after 3 months</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. How much do you support **Strategy 1**?

   DO NOT SUPPORT AT ALL 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 FULLY SUPPORT

2. How much do you support **Strategy 2**?

   DO NOT SUPPORT AT ALL 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 FULLY SUPPORT

3. If you had to choose between the two strategies above, which one would you choose?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy 1</th>
<th>Strategy 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

A30
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strategy 1</th>
<th>Strategy 2</th>
</tr>
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1. How much do you support **Strategy 1**?

DO NOT SUPPORT AT ALL  1  -  2  -  3  -  4  -  5  -  6  FULLY SUPPORT

2. How much do you support **Strategy 2**?

DO NOT SUPPORT AT ALL  1  -  2  -  3  -  4  -  5  -  6  FULLY SUPPORT

3. If you had to choose between the two strategies above, which one would you choose?

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2. How much do you support **Strategy 2**?
   
   DO NOT SUPPORT AT ALL  1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 FULLY SUPPORT

3. If you had to choose between the two strategies above, which one would you choose?

   **Strategy 1**  **Strategy 2**
14. Which of the following statements about you are true? (Select all that apply)
I am currently a serviceman (woman) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
I am currently a member of the National Guard and Police
I am currently an employee of the SSU (Security Services of Ukraine)
I am currently a member of the Territorial Defense
I am currently a volunteer soldier/fighter of a different volunteer battalion
I have taken up arms to defend Ukraine without joining an organization
None of the above are true
Difficult to answer

15. How has the war affected your life? (Select all that apply)
I lost my job after the war began
I went abroad and returned to Ukraine
I joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard and Police, the SSU, or the Territorial Defense
I joined a different volunteer battalion
I help/volunteer as a civilian to support the army/volunteer battalions
Other (Write)
No, nothing has changed
Difficult to answer

16. How has the war affected the life of your family? (Select all that apply)
A relative died
A relative was injured
A relative lost their job
A relative moved to another city/municipality
A relative moved to another region in Ukraine
A relative moved abroad
A relative joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard and Police, or the SSU (Security Services of Ukraine)
A relative voluntarily the army/a volunteer battalion/the Territorial Defense
A relative has taken up arms to defend Ukraine without joining an organization
A relative has helped/volunteered as a civilian to support the army/volunteer battalions
Other (Write)
No, it has not affected
Difficult to answer

17. How important or unimportant for you personally is Ukraine’s victory over Russia in this war?

NOT IMPORTANT AT ALL  1  -  2  -  3  -  4  -  5  -  6  EXTREMELY IMPORTANT

18. In your opinion, is the survival of Ukraine as a nation at stake in this war?
No, the Ukrainian nation will survive even under Russian control
Yes, if Russia wins, it will be the end of Ukraine as a nation
Difficult to answer

19. How much do you trust the President of Ukraine?
I do not trust at all
I rather do not trust
I rather trust
I fully trust
Difficult to answer
20. Do you believe in the victory of Ukraine in the war against the Russian Federation?
Yes
Rather yes
Rather no
No
Difficult to answer

Thank you for participating in the survey!
<table>
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<td>Немає (0%)</td>
<td>Низька (Приблизно 5%)</td>
<td>Помірна (Приблизно 10%)</td>
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<td>5. Ймовірні перспективи через 3 місяці</td>
<td>Виведення російських військ і збереження суверенітету України (включає можливість вступу до ЄС та/або НАТО)</td>
<td>Виведення російських військ і переговори про нейтральний статус України (немає можливості вступити до ЄС та/або НАТО)</td>
<td>Припинення вогню і контролюваній Росією уряд у Києві</td>
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АНКЕТА

ОБЛАСТЬ
________

НАСЕЛЕНИЙ ПУНКТ
__________

НОМЕР ЛАНЦЮЖКА
____________

НОМЕР АНКЕТИ У ЛАНЦЮЖКУ
_________

Якою мовою респонденту зручніше з вами розмовляти:
Українською
На русском
Однаково, але частіше розмовляє українською
Важко сказати - отвірідає українською
Однаково, но чаще разговаривает на русском
Трудно сказать - отвечает на русском

Добрий день, мене звати (ПРЕДСТАВТЕСЯ). Я представляю Київський міжнародний інститут соціології. Наша організація є незалежною професійною організацією з проведення соціологічних опитувань.

Зразок ми проводимо опитування населення для вивчення громадської думки про актуальні події в Україні. Для цього опитування ми випадковим чином, як в лотереї, видіяли понад тисячу жителів України. Дослідження проводиться на замовлення Фонду "Демократичні ініціативи" імені Ілька Кучеряєва та науковця [відредаговано] університету з метою вивчення політичних настроїв в Україні.

Ми гарантуємо Вам анонімність, а також конфіденційність Ваших відповідей. Ваші відповіді будуть занесені в комп'ютер разом з відповідями інших опитаних, а результати опитування будуть використовуватися тільки в узагальненому вигляді.

Ми повністю гарантую збереження Ваших відповідей в таємниці. Для того, щоб результати цього дослідження дійсно відображали погляди всього населення України, нам важливо, щоб саме Ви відповіли на наші запитання.

І тому я дуже прошу приділити мені близько 10-15 хвилин для розмови і заздальнєсть дякую за співпрацю.

До 24 лютого 2022 року, тобто до повномасштабного російського вторгнення, Ви проживали в цьому ж населеному пункті чи в іншому?
У цьому ж
В іншому

А37
Скільки повнолітніх громадян, від 18 років, постійно проживали і проживають заран зарозам з Вами, не беручи до уваги тих, хто переїхав до Вас після 23 лютого 2022 року?
Запишіть, будь ласка, число постійних мешканців.
____________________

Стать обраного респондента:
Чоловіча
Жіноча
Інше (Запишіть)
Не бажаю відповідати

Вік обраного респондента:
Вкажіть число:

1. Ваша сімейний стан:
Неодружений/Незаміжня
Одружений/Заміжня (офіційно зареєстрований шлюб)
Офіційно неодружений/незаміжня, але живемо разом (громадянський шлюб)
Розлучений/а
Офіційно не розлучений/а, але живемо окремо
Вдівець/Вдова
Інше (Запишіть)

2. Чи є у Вас діти?
Немає дітей
1 дитина
2 дитини
3 дитини
4 дитини і більше

3. Ваша освіта:
Базова загальна середня освіта
Повна загальна середня освіта
Професійно-технічна освіта
Середня спеціальна освіта
Вища освіта

4. Як би Ви охарактеризували Ваше поточне матеріальне становище?
Ледве зводжу кінці з кінцями, грошей не вистачає навіть на необхідні продукти
Вистачає на харчування та на придбання необхідних недорогих речей
В цілому на життя вистачає, але на придбання речей тривалого вжитку, таких як меблі, холодильник, телевізор, уже не вистачає коштів
Живу в достатку, але зробити деякі значні покупки поки що не в змозі через брак коштів (купити квартиру, автомобіль тощо)
Маю можливість придбати практично все, що хочу
Важко відповісти/Не бажаю відповідати

5. Яку мову Ви вважаєте рідною?
Українську
Російську
Іншу (Запишіть)
Важко відповісти
6. Хто Ви за національністю (Ваша етнічна принадлежність)?
Українець
Росіянин
Поляк
Угорець
Білорус
Румун
Словак
Молдаван
Інше (Запишіть)
Важко відповісти

7. Які фактори, на Вашу думку, роблять Вас представником обраної етнічної групи? (Оберіть усе, що підходить)
Традиція, етнічна принадлежність моїх батьків, бабусі/дідуся
Мова
Культура та традиції моєї етнічної групи
Релігія моєї етнічної групи
Місце/регіон проживання
Відчуття спільності історії моєї етнічної групи
Громадянство
Особистий вибір етнічної принадлежності
Інше (Запишіть)
Важко відповісти

8. А яка національність Вашого чоловіка (дружини)/партнера (партнерки)?
Українець
Росіянин
Поляк
Угорець
Білорус
Румун
Словак
Молдаван
Інше (Запишіть)
У мене немає чоловіка/дружини або партнера/партнерки
Важко відповісти
Будь ласка, уявіть, що президент Зеленський і його команда розглядають різні військово-політичні стратегії ведення війни впродовж наступних 3-х місяців. Ми пощажаємо вам чотири пари стратегій (всього 8 стратегій) з різними прогнозованими наслідками після 3-місячного періоду. Ми хотіли б, щоб ви щоразу вказували, наскільки ви підтримуєте чи не підтримуєте реалізацію Стратегії 1 або Стратегії 2.

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1. Наскільки ви підтримуєте Стратегію 1?

НЕ ПІДТРИМУЮ ВЗАГАЛІ 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 ПОВНІСТЮ ПІДТРИМУЮ

2. Наскільки ви підтримуєте Стратегію 2?

НЕ ПІДТРИМУЮ ВЗАГАЛІ 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 ПОВНІСТЮ ПІДТРИМУЮ

3. Якби вам довелося вибирати між двома наведеними вище стратегіями, яку з них ви б обрали?

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   НЕ ПІДТРИМУЮ ВЗАГАЛІ 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 ПОВНІСТЮ ПІДТРИМУЮ

2. Наскільки ви підтримуєте Стратегію 2?
   НЕ ПІДТРИМУЮ ВЗАГАЛІ 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 ПОВНІСТЮ ПІДТРИМУЮ

3. Якби вам довелося вибирати між двома наведеними вище стратегіями, яку з них ви б обрали?
   Стратегія 1   Стратегія 2
1. Авансові поступки

2. Прогнозована кількість загиблих серед цивільного населення впродовж наступних 3-х місяців

3. Прогнозована кількість загиблих військових впродовж наступних 3-х місяців (Збройні Сили України, Національна гвардія та поліція, СБУ, Територіальна оборона та добровольчі батальйони)

4. Імовірність ядерного удару по Україні з боку Росії

5. Імовірні перспективи через 3 місяці

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2. Наскільки ви підтримуєте Стратегію 2?

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3. Якби вам довелося вибирати між двома наведеними вище стратегіями, яку з них ви б обрали?

| Стратегія 1 | Стратегія 2 |
1. Авансові поступки

2. Прогнозована кількість загиблих серед цивільного населення впродовж наступних 3-х місяців

3. Прогнозована кількість загиблих військових впродовж наступних 3-х місяців (Збройні Сили України, Національна гвардія та поліція, СБУ, Територіальна оборона та добровольчі батальйони)

4. Ймовірність ядерного удару по Україні з боку Росії

5. Ймовірні перспективи через 3 місяці

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<td>1. Наскільки ви підтримуєте Стратегію 1?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>НЕ ПІДТРИМУЮ ВЗАГАЛІ</td>
<td>1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 ПОВНІСТЮ ПІДТРИМУЮ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Наскільки ви підтримуєте Стратегію 2?

| НЕ ПІДТРИМУЮ ВЗАГАЛІ | 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 ПОВНІСТЮ ПІДТРИМУЮ |

3. Якби вам довелося вибирати між двома наведеними вище стратегіями, яку з них ви б обрали?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Стратегія 1</th>
<th>Стратегія 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
14. Які з наведених нижче тверджень про вас є правдивими? (Оберіть усе, що підходить)
Зараз я військовослужбовець Збройних Сил України
Зараз я є членом Національної гвардії та поліції
Зараз я є співробітником СБУ (Служби безпеки України)
Зараз я є членом територіальної оборони
Зараз я є добровольцем іншого добровольчого батальйону
Я взяв зброю на захист України, не вступаючи в організацію
Жодне з перерахованого вище не відповідає дійсності
Важко відповісти

15. Яким чином війна вплинула на Ваше життя? (Оберіть усе, що підходить)
Втратив (-ла) роботу після початку війни
Виїхав (-ла) за кордон і повернув(-ла)ся в України
Я вступив (-ла) до Збройних Сил України, Нацгвардії та поліції, СБУ чи Територіальної
оборони
Я вступив (-ла) до іншого добровольчого батальйону
Допомагаю/волонтерю як цивільна особа для підтримки армії/добровольчих
батальйонів
Інше (Запишіть)
Ні, нічого не змінилося
Важко відповісти

16. Яким чином війна торкнулася життя Вашої родини? (Оберіть усе, що підходить)
Загинув (-ла) родич (родичка)
Поранений (-на) родич (родичка)
Втратив (-ла) роботу родич (родичка)
Родина переїхала в інше місто/регіон
Родина переїхала в іншу область України
Виїхав (-ла) за кордон родич (родичка)
Родич (родичка) вступив (-ла) до Збройних Сил України, Нацгвардії та поліції або СБУ
(Служби безпеки України)
Родич (родичка) добровільно пішов (-ла) в армію /добровольчий загін/ТрО
Родич (родичка) допомагає/волонтерить як цивільна особа для підтримки
армії/добровольчих батальйонів
Інше (Запишіть)
Ні, ніяк не торкнулася
Важко відповісти

17. Наскільки важливою чи неважливою для вас особисто є перемога України
над Росією у цій війні?
ЗОВСІМ НЕ ВАЖЛИВОЮ    1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 НАДЗВИЧАЙНО
ВАЖЛИВОЮ

18. Як Ви вважаєте - чи стоїть на кону виживання України як нації в цій війні?
Ні, українська нація виживе навіть під контролем Росії
Так, якщо Росія переможе, це буде кінець України як нації
Важко відповісти
19. Наскільки Ви довіряєте Президенту України?
Зовсім не довіряю
Скоріше не довіряю
Скоріше довіряю
Повністю довіряю
Важко відповісти

20. Чи вірите Ви у перемогу України у війні проти Російської Федерації?
Так
Скоріше так
Скоріше ні
Ні
Важко відповісти

ДЯКУЄМО ЗА УЧАСТЬ В ОПИТУВАННІ!